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In this paper we investigate the difficulty of the problem of writing out
formal proofs of given formulas in PRA. We prove a fact saying that
even if we have $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{h}_{\mathrm{P}\mathrm{R}\mathrm{A}}$ as an oracle and even if the target is restricted
to proofs of such simple formulas as $\forall x(f(X)=0)$ , we will have no
“effective” strategy to write out formal proofs in PRA. ( $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{h}_{\mathrm{P}\mathrm{R}\mathrm{A}}$ is the
characteristic function of the set of the G\"odel numbers of theorelns in
PRA.)
1 Introduction
G\"odel proved the second incompleteness theoreln by forlnalizing the proof of the
first incompleteness theorem. This technique made an epoch in proof theory, and
it has been widely used. But it is remarkable that giving a perfect proof of the
second incompleteness theorem is practically impossible because it needs writing out
vast formal proofs in arithmetic. Why must we write out formal proofs? Let $T$ be
a suitable system of arithlnetic such that $T$ has function sylnbols of all prilnitive
recursive functions and that the incolnpleteness theorem holds for T. (For example,
take the Prilnitive Recursive Arithllletic as $T.$ ) Now suppose we are given a $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{l}\cdot \mathrm{o}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\ln$
“show $T\vdash f(m)=n$” where $f$ is a prilnitive recursive function. Then instead of
giving a detailed proof in $T$ , we can use the fact:
$f(m)=?l$ is true $\Leftrightarrow$ $T\vdash f(m)=n$ .
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That is, showing that “$f(m)=n$ is true” is sufficient to show it is provable in $T$ .
However if the problem becomes a little complicated as $‘\zeta \mathrm{s}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\tau\vdash\forall x(f(X)=n)$”,
then we cannot use the above strategy because in general
$\forall x(f(X)=n)$ is true $\neq\Leftarrow$ $T\vdash\forall x(f(X)=n)$ .
Indeed the incompleteness theorem shows the existence of a primitive recursive func-
tion $f$ such that $\forall x(f(X)=n)$ is true but $\tau\mu\forall x(f(X)=n)$ . Therefore to give a per-
fec.t positive answer to this probleln, we must write out a proof figure of $\forall x(f(X)=n)$
in $T$ . A proof of the second incompleteness theorem essentially contains such prob-
lelns, and we feel that giving a perfec.t proof of the second incompleteness theorem is
practically impossible. In this paper we try to express such $‘\iota_{\mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{c}}}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{a}1}$ ilnpossibility”
objectively.
We will investigate the difficulty of the problem of writing out proofs of given
forlnulas of the form $\forall x(f(X)=\uparrow\iota)$ in $T$ . First we define a function $\Omega$ by
$\Omega(f)=\{$
a proof of $\forall X_{\backslash }^{(f(x}$ ) $=0$ ) in $T$ if $T\vdash\forall x(f(x)=0)$ ,
$0$ otherwise.
(To be more exact, $\Omega’ \mathrm{s}$ input is a G\"odel number of a primitive recursive function
$f$ , and the output is the minimum $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{T}}\dot{\mathrm{o}}$del number of a proof of $\forall x(f(X)=0)$ , or $0.$ )
Our first result is that $\Omega$ is not recursive. (Corollary 3.2)
By the way, when one is asked to show either a proof of $T\vdash A$ or the fact that
$A$ is not provable, what he will do is perhaps based on his intuition,
$\bullet$ to try to generate some candidates of subproofs of a proof of $A$ , and
$\bullet$ to decide whether the conclusions of the candidates of the subproofs are prov-
able or not.
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The intuition may be regarded as an oracle, in the ternlinology of recursion theory.
This observation suggests us the possibility of studying the colnputability of the
function $\Omega$ with some oracles. It is then easy to show that $\Omega$ is recursive in $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{h}_{T}$
(i.e., recursive with $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{h}_{T}$ as an oracle) where $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{h}_{T}$ is the characteristic function of
the set of the G\"odel numbers of forlnulas provable in $T$ . On the other hand, $\Omega$ is not
primitive recursive in $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{h}_{T}$ , and moreover $\Omega$ is not primitive recursive in any class of
functions $\{f_{1}, f_{2}, \ldots\}$ so long as each $f_{i}$ has a recursive upper bound (Theorem 3.3).
This is our main result in this paper.
These results indicate that even if we have $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{h}_{T}$ as an oracle and even if our
target is restricted to proofs of such simple formulas as $\forall x(f(x)=0)$ , we will have
no “effective” strategy to write out forlnal proofs in $T$ .
2 Preliminaries
$N$ will denote natural numbers $\{0,1,2, \ldots\}$ , and “functions” will nlean total
functions over $N$ .
The class $\mathrm{P}$ of primitive recursive functions is defined as usual (see, e.g., [1]) to
be the smallest class satisfying the following conditions:
$\bullet$ (Initial functions) The unary function $Z$ , the unary function $S$ , and the k-ary
function $\mathcal{P}_{i}^{k}$ is in $\mathrm{P}(1\leq i\leq k)$ where
$Z(n)=0$ (constant Zero),
$S(n)=n+1$ (Successor),
$P_{i}^{k}(n_{1}, \ldots, nk)=n_{i}$ (Projection).
$\bullet$ (Composition) If $f$ is an $m$-ary function in $\mathrm{P}$ and $g_{1},$ $\ldots,$ $g_{m}$ are $k$-ary functions
in $\mathrm{P}$ , then the $k$-ary function $C[f, g_{1}, \ldots, \mathit{9}m]$ is also in $\mathrm{P}$ where
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$C[f, g1, \ldots,cjm](n_{1}, \ldots, nk)=f(g1(n_{1\cdots,k},n),$ $\ldots,C_{m}J(n1, \ldots, nk))$ .
$\bullet$ (Primitive recursion) If $f$ is a $k$-ary function in $\mathrm{P}$ and $g$ is a $(k+2)$-ary $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}}$
in $\mathrm{P}$ , then the $(k+1)$-ary function $\mathcal{R}[f, g]$ is also in $\mathrm{P}$ where
$R[f, g](n_{\perp}, \ldots, n_{k}, \mathrm{o})=f(\uparrow\iota 1, \ldots, nk)$
$\mathcal{R}[f, g](n_{1}, \ldots, ?l_{k}, S(l?l))=g(?\iota_{1}, \ldots, n_{k}, \eta l, \mathcal{R}[f., g](n1, \ldots, nk, m))$ .
Let $F$ be a class of functions. If the condition
$F\subset \mathrm{P}$
is added to the above definition of $\mathrm{P}$ , then functions in $\mathrm{P}$ are said to be primitive
recursive in $F$ . If $f$ is a $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}}$ being prilnitive recursive in $F$ , then there is an
expression consisting of
$[, ]$ , $Z,$ $S,$ $\mathcal{P}_{i}^{k},$ $C,$ $\mathcal{R}$ , and the names of the functions in $F$
which defines $f$ . We say the expression is the description of the $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}}f$ being
primitive recursive in $F$ . Of course lllany $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{c}\Gamma \mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{D}}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}_{0}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}$ may define one $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}}$ .
The axiom systenl $\mathrm{P}\mathrm{R}\mathrm{A}$(Primitive Recursive $\mathrm{A}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}_{1}11\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{C}$ ) (see, e.g., [2]) is de-
fined as follows.
The symbols in the language of PRA are the following:
$\bullet$ Constant symbol: $\overline{0}$ .
$\bullet$ $k$-ary function symbol $\overline{f}$ for each description $f$ of $k$-ary primitive recursive
function. For example, $\overline{S}$ is an unary function sylnbol and $\overline{\mathcal{R}[P_{1}^{1},c[S,P^{3}]3]}$ is a
binary function sylnbol. (The latter represents $”+$ ” Froln now on, the term
$\overline{R[\mathcal{P}_{1}^{1},C[s,\mathcal{P}^{3}3]]}(t1, t_{2})$ will be abbreviated to $t_{1}+t_{2}.$ )
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$\bullet$ Variable synlbols: $\mathrm{v}_{0},$ $\mathrm{v}_{1},$ $\mathrm{v}_{2}\ldots$
$\bullet$ Predicate sylnbol: $=$ .
$\bullet$ Logical connectives and quantifiers: $\neg,$ $\wedge,$ $\vee,$ $arrow,$ $rightarrow,$ $\forall,$ $\exists$ .
Terms and formulas are defined as usual froln these synibols. $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}\overline{0},\overline{s}(\overline{0}),$ $\overline{s}(\overline{s}(\overline{0})),$ $\ldots$
are called numerals, and they will be denoted by $\overline{0},$ $\overline{1},$ $\overline{2},$ $.,.,$ respectively. If $A(x)$ is
a forlnula with free variable $x$ , then $A(t)$ means the fornlula obtained from $A(x)$ by
replacing $x$ by the term $t$ .
The axionls and inference rules in PRA consist of the following:
$\bullet$ Usual axiolns and inference rules for classical first-order logic with $=$ .





$\overline{C[f,C_{1}J,\ldots,c_{n}/\tau]}(\mathrm{V}_{1\cdots,k},\mathrm{V})=\overline{f}(\overline{C_{1}J}(\mathrm{V}_{1,\ldots,k}\mathrm{V}), \ldots,\overline{g_{?}?\mathit{1}}(\mathrm{v}_{1}, \ldots, \mathrm{V}k))$
$\overline{\mathcal{R}[f,g]}(\mathrm{v}1, \ldots, \mathrm{V}k,\overline{0})=\overline{f}(\mathrm{V}_{1}, \ldots, \mathrm{V}_{k})$
$\overline{\mathcal{R}[f,g]}(\mathrm{v}1, \ldots, \mathrm{V}k,\overline{S}(\mathrm{V}0))=\overline{g}(\mathrm{V}1, \ldots, \mathrm{V}k, \mathrm{V}0,\overline{\mathcal{R}[f,C/]}(\mathrm{v}_{1}, \ldots, \mathrm{V}_{k}, \mathrm{v}\mathrm{o}))$
$\bullet$ The induction axiom for each quantifier-free formula $A(x)$ :
( $A(\overline{0})$ A $\forall x(A(x)arrow A(\overline{S}(x)))$ ) $arrow\forall xA(x)$
We assume a standard G\"odel nulnbering function Gn; that is, $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{n}(\alpha)$ codes each
expression $\alpha$ in PRA (see, e.g. [2]). If $\mathrm{c}_{\mathrm{T}\mathrm{n}}(\alpha)=n$ , then $\lceil_{\alpha}\rceil$ will denote the numeral
$\overline{n}$ .
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The following Propositions 2.1-2.3 are well-known. See, e.g., [1] and [2] for the
proofs.
Proposition 2.1 Let $f$ be a description of a k-ary primitiue recursive function.
Then
$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{R}\mathrm{A}\vdash\overline{f}(\overline{\gamma l1}, \ldots,\overline{\uparrow lk})=\overline{\gamma?l}$ if $f.(n_{1}, \ldots, n_{k})=??\mathrm{t}$
$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{R}\mathrm{A}\vdash\urcorner(\overline{f}(\overline{\uparrow l1}, \ldots, \overline{\uparrow lk})=\overline{\uparrow?\mathrm{t}})$ if $f(n_{1}, \ldots, \uparrow\not\supset_{k})\neq??l$
for all $n_{1},$ $\ldots,$ $tl_{k},$ $l\in N$ .
Proposition 2.2 For any k-ary $recur\mathit{8}ive$ predicate $R$ , there is a $f_{orm}ula\overline{R}(X1, \ldots, Xk)$
such that
$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{R}\mathrm{A}\vdash\overline{R}(\overline{n_{1}}, \ldots,\overline{\gamma \mathrm{t}k})$ if $R(\uparrow l_{1,\ldots,k}n)$ holds
$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{R}\mathrm{A}\vdash\neg\overline{R}(\overline{\uparrow\iota_{1,\ldots,k}}\overline{n})$ if $R(?l_{1}, \ldots, n_{k})$ does not hold
for all $?l_{1},$ $\ldots,$ $\uparrow \mathrm{t}k\in N$ .
Proposition 2.3 For any formula $A(x)$ with at most one free variable $\backslash ?i$ , there is
a sentence $B$ such that $\mathrm{P}\mathrm{R}\mathrm{A}\vdash Brightarrow A(\lceil_{B}\rceil)$ .
3 Main result
Let Prov be the $1$) $\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}$ recursive binary predicate defined by
$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{V}(m, n)\Leftrightarrow n$ codes a formula $A$ and $m$ codes a proof of $A$ in PRA.
Then we give a precise definition of tlle function $\Omega$ :
$\Omega(n)=\{$
$\mu y[\mathrm{p}_{\Gamma 0}\mathrm{v}(y, \mathrm{C}\mathrm{T}\mathrm{n}(\forall \mathrm{v}_{0}(\overline{f}(\mathrm{v}\mathrm{o})=\overline{0})))]$ if $n=\mathrm{G}\mathrm{n}(\overline{f})$ for sonle unary




Lemma 3.1 There $i\mathit{8}$ no formula $Q(x)$ with a free ,uariable $x$ such tllat
$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{R}\mathrm{A}\vdash Q(\lceil_{\overline{f}}\rceil)$ if $\mathrm{P}\mathrm{R}\mathrm{A}\vdash\forall \mathrm{v}_{\mathrm{o}(\overline{f}()}\mathrm{v}_{0}=\overline{0}$) (1)
$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{R}\mathrm{A}\vdash\neg Q(\lceil_{\overline{f}}\rceil)$ if PRA $r\forall \mathrm{V}_{0}(\overline{f}(\mathrm{V}_{0}\mathrm{I}=\overline{0})$ (2)
for any unary function symbol $\overline{f}$ .
Proof By “Rosser’s technique” we show that the existence of suc.h $Q(x)$ yields
contradiction.
Let $A$ be a formula. Then we have a prilllitive $\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{u}\Gamma \mathrm{s}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{V}\mathrm{e}$ function $\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}_{A}\mathrm{s}\iota\iota \mathrm{C}.\mathrm{h}$ that
$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}_{A}(n\tau)=\{$
1 if Prov $(t?l, \mathrm{G}^{(}\mathrm{n}(A))$ and $\forall y\leq??\mathrm{t}(\neg \mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{r}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{V}(1j, \mathrm{G}^{\mathrm{t}}\mathrm{n}(\neg A)))$ ,
$0$ ot.herwise.
A precise description of $\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}_{A}$ is as follows. Let $\mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}}(\uparrow?l, t\iota)$ and $\mathrm{n}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{p}\Gamma \mathrm{o}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}(77\mathrm{z}, \gamma l)$ be
the primitive recursive functions:
prove$(nl, n)=\{$
1 if $\mathrm{P}_{\Gamma \mathrm{O}\mathrm{V}}(??\mathrm{t},$ $?l\mathrm{I}$ ,
$0$ otherwise,
(We are assulning that $0$ does not code any proofs.) Then
$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}_{A}(m)=\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}(m, \mathrm{C}\mathrm{T}\mathrm{n}(A))*\mathrm{n}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}(\uparrow?l, \mathrm{G}\mathrm{n}(\neg A))$ .
From now on, “$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}_{A}$ ” will denote such a description.
There is a primitive recursive function $\mathrm{g}$ such that
$\mathrm{g}(\mathrm{c}_{7}\mathrm{n}(A))=\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{T}}\mathrm{n}(\overline{\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}_{A}})$ (3)
holds for any forlnula $A$ . Then let $\overline{\mathrm{g}}$ be a function sylnbol of such $\mathrm{g}$ . By Proposition
2.3 we obtain a sentence $P$ such that
$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{R}\mathrm{A}\vdash Prightarrow Q(\overline{\mathrm{g}}(\lceil_{P}1))$ . (4)
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Now we consider two possible $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{S}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{S}$ :
(Case 1) $\mathrm{P}\mathrm{R}\mathrm{A}\vdash\forall \mathrm{V}_{0}(\overline{\mathrm{p}\Gamma_{P()\overline{0})}}\mathrm{V}0=\cdot$ (5)
(Case 2) PRA $\forall\forall \mathrm{v}_{0}(\overline{\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}P}(\mathrm{v}_{0})=\overline{0})$ . (6)
In case 1 we have
$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{R}\mathrm{A}\vdash Q(\lceil\overline{\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}_{P}}1)$ $(\overline{/})$
by (1). By the way, (3) and Proposition 2.1 inlply
$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{R}\mathrm{A}\vdash\overline{\mathrm{g}}(^{\lceil_{P}1)}=\mathrm{r}_{\overline{\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}_{P}}}1$ . (8)
Then (4), (7), and (8) inlply
$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{R}\mathrm{A}\vdash P$
i.e., there is a proof of $P$ in PRA. Let $??l$ be the G\"odel nulllber of a proof of $P$ ,
then we have
$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{R}\mathrm{A}\vdash\neg(\overline{\mathrm{P}1_{P(}^{\cdot}}\overline{t|l})=\overline{\mathrm{o}})$
by the definition of $\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}_{P}$ , consistency of PRA, and Proposition 2.1. So we have
$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{R}\mathrm{A}\vdash\exists \mathrm{v}_{0}\neg(\overline{\mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{r}_{P}}}(\mathrm{V}0)=\overline{\mathrm{o}})$
but this is impossible because of (5) and the consistency of PRA.
In case 2 we have
$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{R}\mathrm{A}\vdash\neg Q(\mathrm{r}\overline{\mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{r}_{P}1)}}$ (9)
by (2). Then (4), (8), and (9) imply
$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{R}\mathrm{A}\vdash\neg P$
i.e., there is a proof of $\urcorner P$ in PRA. Let $m$ be the G\"odel number of a proof of $\neg P$ ,
then we have
$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{R}\mathrm{A}\vdash\overline{\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}_{P}}(\overline{i})=\overline{0}$ , for $i–\mathrm{o},$ $1,$ $\cdots,$ $\eta-1$ (10)
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$\forall \mathrm{v}_{1}(\overline{\mathrm{n}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}}(\mathrm{v}\mathrm{l}+\overline{m}, \lceil_{\neg P}\rceil)=\overline{0})$
is proved in PRA by using the induction axiom. On the other hand, we have
$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{R}\mathrm{A}\vdash\forall \mathrm{v}_{0}(\mathrm{v}_{0}=\overline{0}\mathrm{v}_{0}=\overline{1}\mathrm{V}\cdots\vee \mathrm{v}_{0}=\overline{m-1}\vee\exists \mathrm{v}_{1}(\mathrm{v}_{0}=\mathrm{v}_{1}+\overline{m}))^{1}$ . (12)
Then, (10), (11) and (12) imply
$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{R}\mathrm{A}\vdash\forall \mathrm{v}_{0}(\overline{\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}_{p}}(\mathrm{V}0)=\overline{0})$ ,
and this contradicts (6). 1
Corollary 3.2 The function $\Omega$ is not recursive.
Proof By Proposition 2.2 and Lemma 3.1. 1
Theorem 3.3 Let $F$ be a class offunctions such that each $f$ in $F$ has a recursive up-
per bound, $i.e,$. there is a recursive function $g$ for $f$ such $that\forall n_{1}\cdots\forall nk(f(n1, \ldots, n_{k})\leq$
$g(n_{1}, \ldots, n_{k}))$ . Then the function $\Omega$ is not primitive recursive in F. 2
Proof We show that if $\Omega$ were primitive recursive in $F$ , then we could construct
an algorithm to compute $\Omega$ . This together with Corollary 3.2 proves the theorem.
1This formula is provable in Robinson’s arithmetic $\mathrm{Q}$ (see, $\mathrm{e}.\mathrm{g}.,$ $[1]$ ). Note that $\mathrm{Q}$ has an axiom
$\forall x(\neg(x=0)arrow\exists y(x=\overline{S}(y)))$ , which is provable in PRA by applying the induction axiom to the
formula $\neg(x=0)arrow x=\overline{S}(\overline{\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{v}}(x))$ where prev(O) $=0$ and prev$(S(n))=n$ .
2In an earlier version of this paper, the statement of this theorem is weaker and inelegant: “ ,.,
each $f$ in $F$ is either a recursive function or a function whose range is $\{0,1\}.$” The present form
is suggested by Professor $\mathrm{I}<\mathrm{o}\mathrm{j}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}$ Kobayashi, to whom the author would like to give his thanks.
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Suppose $\alpha$ is a description of a $k$-ary function which is primitive recursive in $F$ ,
and $n_{1},$ $\ldots,$ $n_{k}\in N$ . We will call the expression
$\alpha(n_{1}, \ldots, n_{k})$
a redex. We now define the rules of reduction, $\mathrm{i}.\mathrm{e}$ , rewriting a redex:
1. (Deterministic reduction)
(a) $Z(n)$ $\Rightarrow$ $0$
(b) $S(n)$ $\Rightarrow$ $n+1$
(c) $\mathcal{P}_{i}^{k}(n_{1}, \ldots, n_{k})$ $\Rightarrow$ ni
(d) $C[\alpha, \beta_{1}, \ldots, \beta_{m}](?l1, \ldots, n_{k})$ $\Rightarrow$ $\alpha(\beta_{1}(n_{1}, \ldots, nk), \ldots, \beta_{m}(n_{1}, \ldots, n_{k}))$
(e) $\mathcal{R}[a, \beta](n_{1}, \ldots, ?\iota_{k}, ?\gamma l)$ $\Rightarrow$
$\beta(n_{1}, \ldots, n_{k}, m-1, \beta(n_{1}, \ldots, n_{k}, m-2, \beta(\cdots\beta(n_{1}, \ldots, n_{k}, 1, \alpha(n_{1\cdots,k},n))\cdots)))$
2. (Nondeterministic reduction)
If $f$ is the name of a function in $F$ then there is a recursive upper bound $g$ of
$f$ , and then there are $(m+1)$ ways to reduce the redex $f(n_{1,\ldots,k}n)$ :
$f(n_{1}, \ldots, n_{k})$ $\Rightarrow$ $0,1,$
$\ldots,$
$m$
where $m=g(n_{1}, \ldots, n_{k})$ .
If the function $\Omega$ were primitive recursive in $F$ , there is a description $\omega$ of $\Omega$ . Then
we can effectively compute the value of $\Omega(n)$ for a given $n$ , as follows:
If $n\neq \mathrm{G}\mathrm{n}(\overline{f})$ for any unary function symbol $\overline{f}$ , then $\Omega(n)=0$ . If $n=\mathrm{G}\mathrm{n}(\overline{f})$ ,













$\uparrow l_{m}\in N$ $\backslash \backslash >\iota\iota,?1$
$.\Rightarrow$ . means a deternlinistic reduction of a redex.
$\searrow d_{\Rightarrow}...\cdot$
llleans a nondeternlinistic reduction of a redex.
Note that the length of each path in the reduction tree is finite because the depth of
the nests of “ $[]$ ” in $\omega(n)$ must decrease by reductions. Therefore, by K\"onig’s Lemnla,
the reduction tree is finite, and we can effectively compute the values of $n_{1},$ $\ldots,$ $\iota x_{m}$ .
Then, for $i=1,$ $\ldots,$ $?\uparrow\tau$ , we examine whether $n_{i}$ satisfies Prov$(tli, \mathrm{G}\mathrm{n}(\forall \mathrm{V}\mathrm{o}(\overline{f}(\mathrm{v}\mathrm{o})=\overline{\mathrm{o}})))$.
If such $tl_{i}$ exists, then $\Omega(n)=\mathrm{n}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\{n_{i}|\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{v}(\uparrow\iota_{i}, \mathrm{G}\mathrm{n}(\forall \mathrm{v}0(\overline{f}(\mathrm{v}_{0})=\overline{0})))\}$, otherwise
$\Omega(n)=0$ .
This algorithnl is conlplete because there must be at nlost one $n_{i}$ satisfying the
above condition if $\Omega(n)\neq 0$ . I
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